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Abstract 
A bank generally hold more equity capital than required by their regulators. We 
hypothesize that stock market has a disciplining role vis-à-vis bank managers that 
forces them to increase their capital level. For market discipline to be effective, 
market factors such as changes in firm equity values and returns, would influence 
bank decision making. We apply the model to annual panel data for publicly traded 
bank holding companies in three stock markets over a sample period from 2006 to 
2015. Using OLS and fixed effect, we find a significantly positive relationship 
between market discipline and bank capital structure. In addition, we find that market 
discipline is a more effective to enhance bank capital when bank perform efficiently. 
Robust tests based on instrumental variable and dynamic GMM evidence of a causal 
link between market discipline and bank capital structure. The results have certain 
policy implications for understanding the role of stock market in affecting bank 
operation that in turn could improve bank prudency and assist the design of an 
enhanced regulation framework. 
 
 
Keywords: Market discipline, Informed trading, PIN, Bank capital  
JEL Classification: C61, G14, G21. 
 
*Department of Business and Management, School of Business, Management and 
Economics, Jubilee Building, University of Sussex, Falmer BN1 9SL, UK. 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
1 Introduction 
The capital adequacy requirement is one of the appropriate tools for regulator to 
maintain the stability of banking system. A wealth body of theoretical and empirical 
banking literature suggests that bank capital level purely reflects regulatory minimum 
requirements. However, recent banking literature reveal that banks maintain or 
strengthen their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity and want to 
strengthen their capital structure and thus solvency standards and improve their ability 
to raise external funds (Distinguin et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2008; Gropp and Heider, 
2010).  
 
The challenges in monitoring banks are closely linked to the complexity and 
information asymmetry problem featuring this unique sector (De Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). Informed trading, by incorporating private information into share 
price, is central to price discovery process and eventually enhances price 
informativeness in stock markets (Ealey and O’Hara, 2004). Governance via informed 
trading has recently been recognised potentially as a market discipline mechanism on 
the management of firms which complement legal and regulatory institutions, thus 
improving market efficiency (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans 2009; Edmans 
and Manso, 2011; Edmans et al., 2013; Ferreira et al., 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; 
Gallagher et al., 2013; Massa et al., 2015). The basic insight is that informed trades 
drive stock prices to fundamentals, dependent on corporate managerial actions. With 
stock price more sensitive to these actions, governance through trading credibly 
rewards (penalizes) the stock-incentivized manager, who ex ante has greater incentive 
to put in effort by means of costly hidden actions (Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). 
Ultimately stock-incentivized managers exert more effort on behalf of shareholders 
(Gallagher et al, 2013; Edmans et al, 2013, 2015; Zhang et al, 2015; Massa et al, 
2015). 
 
Despite trading as a widely-recognized market discipline in corporate governance 
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literature, its role in affecting bank capital structure has been neglected. In this 
research, we focus on informed trading and investigate how it target banks with 
different performance and ultimately how it affects bank capital ratio. We argue that 
informed trading, by actively incorporating superior insight of a bank real 
fundamental status including its solvency condition into share price, should act as an 
“invisible” hand to discipline bank managers. It should especially target those 
“under-performing” bank managers, thus acts as a private enforcement to force 
managers to strengthen their solvency standards above the mandatory minimum 
requirement. The effectiveness of trading, as the market discipline, should become 
more effective if bank managers are more stock-incentivized. Our analysis can 
enhance our understanding of why banks maintain their capital buffer from a market 
discipline perspective. It has implications for policy makers on whether and under 
what conditions market discipline via informed trading can act as an effective private 
enforcement to strengthen the solvency standards in addition to the public mandatory 
minimum requirement. 
 
This study focus on banks listed on stock exchanges from Mainland China, 
HongKong and Taiwan. This is because Mainland China is the largest emerging 
economy where disclosure quality is poor, and stock option compensation is not 
allowed in its banking sector. Despite Hong Kong and Taiwai share many similar 
market and culture characteristics with Mainland China, with economy development 
and financial systems being increasingly integrated, they have highly 
stock-incentivized managers in their banking sector. Especially Hong Kong has the 
highest disclosure quality and most stock-incentivized bank managers among these 
three. Thus, these three markets represent a good opportunity for us to mitigate 
different culture related impacts on capital buffer decisions made by bank managers, 
focus on the impacts of informed trading conducted in similar market structure on 
different degree stock-incentivized bank managers and their capital buffer decisions. 
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We employ a three-step procedure to generate the empirical evidence in this study. 
First, the level of informed trading is estimated using a market microstructure model 
(PIN) and high frequency trade and bid-ask data. Following recent literature (Flannery 
and Giacomini, 2015; De Jonghe and Oztekin, 2015; and Lepetit et al., 2015), we 
measure capital level using the traditional ratio of total capital to total asset. We 
measure bank performance using bank efficiency estimated by frontier approach. Our 
main finding is under-performing banks attracts a high level of informed trading, 
which in turn leads to a lower level of capital buffer held by a bank. Our results are 
robust in pooled OLS, fixed effect panel-regression, IV-2SLS and dynamic GMM 
approach panel regression estimations, while controlling for several specific bank 
financial and macro-economic characteristics. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper makes the 
attempt to explore the role of informed trading in banking sector through 
microstructure perspective. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first paper to link 
the literature concerned with PIN in the context of market microstructure and the 
numerous empirical work on bank capital structure. Second, our study sheds light on 
the bank performing condition which market discipline influences capital structure, 
which adds a new dimension to the understanding of the relation between market 
discipline and bank capital decisions. Third, our study also gives empirical analysis on 
the relationship between bank capital and efficiency using the sample of Great China 
listed banks, while the existing theory often provides contradictory predictions. 
Moreover, a single-market study seems appropriate for this type of analysis. However, 
given the cross-market discrepancy in the development level of capital markets, 
culture homogeneous samples provide an excellent laboratory for understanding the 
role of information in banking sector. 
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
related literature on informed trading as the market discipline force and literature on 
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the determinants of bank buffer. Drawing on these theoretical insights, we develop 
hypotheses relating market discipline and bank capital structure, as well as the bank 
managers as the condition of effectiveness of bank performance to discipline bank 
managers and affect bank capital decision. We then explain the operationalisation of 
the dependent and explanatory variables, present and discuss some descriptive 
statistics, and outline the estimation methodology for the main regression analysis. 
The empirical results are then presented and discussed, as well as several robustness 
tests. Finally, we conclude with some comments about the importance and 
applicability of our analysis and make some suggestions about future work. 
 
 
2 Literature review and Hypothesis development 
2.1 Bank capital 
Although the role of capital has varied over time, it remains an important source of 
funds for banks in all countries. Normally bank capital is finance by shareholder’s 
fund and same as non-financial firms that serve three important functions. First, 
capital can be a buffer against adverse outcomes. Second, bank capital creates 
incentive for management to manager risk when inverts in risky assets. High capital 
implies higher losses for the banks’ shareholders in case of default, and hence lower 
incentives for risk-taking (Hilscher and Raviv, 2014). Besides, regulators may require 
some additional capital for individual bank that are perceived to pose significant risks. 
Third, sufficient capital can be a single to different stakeholders suggesting that the 
bank will not be taken advantage of.  
 
Such adjust is require by regulation 
Capital adequacy ratio has played an important role for the regulation as banks have 
long been subject to explicit or implicit limits on their permissible leverage level. 
Setting capital requirements is a major policy issue for regulators. The 1988 Basel 
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Accord1 and subsequent amendments significantly influence the effectiveness of 
bank capital structure. A common justification for bank capital regulation is the 
reduction of bank moral hazard and conflicts between equity holders and debt holders. 
An under-capitalized bank may take excessive risks for maximizing its shareholder 
wealth. This incentive is reducing if banks have capital at risk. As the equity capital is 
costly for bank compare with other types of funds, thus bank managers attempt to 
economize on the use of this valuable resource.  
 
Although the regulatory constraint is one of factors related to the determinant of 
capital level, but it is not the most important (Barrios and Blanco, 2003). Gropp and 
Heider (2008) do not detect a first-order effect of regulation on banks' capital holdings. 
They find from the similarity of their sample banks and non-financial firms that 
functioning as a buffer against regulatory distress, conclude that the regulatory 
requirement is not the major role of bank equity. In addition, despite banks complied 
with regulatory standards for minimum capital requirement, several financial crises 
undoubtedly demonstrated that existing capital regulation was inadequate to prevent a 
panic in the financial sector. The historic system of relying on book capital rules and 
supervisory (Basel Pillar 2) discretion to maintain adequate capital may need to revise 
(Flannery and Giacomini, 2015). Benink and Wihlborg (2002) find that supervision 
alone cannot prevent banks from ‘gaming and manipulation’ of risk-weights.  
 
Banks like to adjust their capital ratio 
Both theoretical (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Barrios and 
Blanco, 2003) and empirical (Miles et al. 2013; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Berger et 
al. 2008) literatures imply that banks have a target capital structure, which is different 
from the regulatory requirement. Barrios and Blanco (2003) developed two theoretical 
models, the first one for firms not affected by capital adequacy regulation, the second 
one for firms which are. They demonstrate in both models that the existence of an 
                                                             
1 The Basel Agreement of 1988 is to ensure the financial institutions have enough capital to meet the obligation, 
which requires that banks in European countries meet the minimum capital ratios of four percent tier 1 capital and 
eight percent tier 1 plus tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. 
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optimal capital ratio. In addition, Diamond and Rajan (2000) summary that optimal 
capital structure for bank trades off three effects of capital, rent absorbed by the 
banker, against shocks and extracted from borrowers. In addition, banks might target 
higher capital ratios to mitigate insolvency risk. Given the historically high 
profitability of banking sector, bank increase the capital ratio because earnings were 
easily retained. Berger et al. (2008) find that banks actively managed their capital 
ratio, set target capital levels above regulatory minima, and made rapid adjustments 
toward their targets. Alternatively, banks might target lower capital ratios to maintain 
lending relationships and competitive advantage. 
 
Gropp and Heider (2008) conclude that unobserved time-invariant bank fixed-effects 
are ultimately the most important determinant of banks’ capital structures. De Jonghe 
and Oztekin (2015) find that banks make faster capital structure adjustments in 
countries with more stringent capital requirements, better supervisory monitoring, 
more developed capital markets, and high inflation a global sample of 64 countries. 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) find that large German private commercial banks 
(neither state-owned nor cooperative) and banks with a high level of proprietary 
trading are more likely to adjust their capital ratio tightly. Lepetit et al. (2015) find 
that the internal governance mechanisms affect the way banks adjust to the target 
capital structure.  
 
Market discipline 
To make progress in understanding bank capital structure, it is necessary to consider 
other different determinants. Market discipline might be an instrument induce banks 
holding appropriate capital is stronger under the Basel Accord. Because markets have 
significant resources with numerous investors and analysts having access to both 
public and private information about banks’ operation. For market discipline to be 
effective, market factors such as changes in equity values and returns, would 
influence firms’ manager decision making. Therefore, market participants can affect 
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bank behavior. Bliss and Flannery (2002) show that market discipline implies two 
distinct notions: private investors’ ability to understand (monitor) a financial firm’s 
true condition, and their ability to influence managerial actions.  
 
Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue that banks' capital ratios were primarily driven by 
the pressure of market forces rather than regulatory constraints. Besides, Allen et al. 
(2011) also claim that market discipline is imposed as the bank’s capital used to 
provide monitoring incentives. Bennett et al. (2015) suggest that market discipline 
tends to begin far enough in advance to signal to both banks and supervisors that 
corrective actions can and should be taken. Curry et al. (2008) claim that equity 
market can provide timely information and add value to bank holding company. 
Hilscher and Raviv (2014) show that effecting market discipline via introducing 
contingent capital into banks' capital structures represents a possibility to substantially 
reduce incentives to increase bank risk and decrease the bank failure rate. 
 
The informational efficiency of prices is a key attribute of capital markets that can 
have significant implications for the real economy. Thus, information from stock 
market is a useful mechanism for designing corporate governance and can discipline 
managers on corporate investment decisions (Gorton et al., 2016; Dow et al., 2015; 
Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004; Ferreira et al., 2011; Ferreira and Laux, 2007). 
Indeed, investors can exert governance through affecting stock price. The stock prices 
generate informative signals that affect how managers run their companies. Gorton et 
al. (2016) show that there is a fundamental tension between the informativeness of 
stock prices and the effectiveness of market discipline in corporate governance. Dow 
et al. (2015) analyze the incentives for financial market trader to produce information 
about firm’s investment opportunities.  
 
More specifically, number of literatures argues that the stock trading can be an 
effective mechanism of market discipline in corporate governance (Admati and 
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Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2011). By trading on information, 
market participate move the stock price toward fundamental value and closely reflect 
the effort exerted by managers. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) claim that public 
trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large 
shareholder’s incentives to engage in value-increasing activity. Edams (2009) find 
that institutional trading enhances the informational efficiency of the firm’s equity, 
which lead myopic managers to make better financing decisions. Massa et al. (2015) 
suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline 
managers. 
 
Market discipline can be a source from information asymmetry, which arise from 
differential information between informed and non-informed traders. Informed traders 
normally are large shareholders, financial analysts and managers. Informed traders 
use superior knowledge on such private information to obtain private benefit. 
Managerial private benefits commonly represent as shirking, managerial career 
concerns, and perquisites in previous studies. John et al. (2000) recognize that 
managerial compensation schemes may directly affect bank risk taking preference. In 
addition, Barakat et al. (2014) find that the increase in information asymmetry is 
higher for internal fraud-related events. Dell’Ariccia (2001) suggest that informational 
asymmetries are important determinants of the industry structure and of banks' 
strategic behavior. 
 
Allen et al. (2011) show that market discipline affects the level of banks capital level 
when credit markets are competitive by encouraging monitoring. A large body of 
evidence in banking sector suggests that markets monitor banks effectively and 
promptly. For instance, Flannery and Rangan (2008) demonstrate that market 
investors can influence bank behavior in terms of capital decision. Barrios and Blanco 
(2003) conclude that the pressure of market discipline is the main determinant of 
banks capital requirements. Nier and Baumann (2006) suggest that market discipline 
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is effective in providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default by holding 
capital buffers. 
 
Hypothesis development 
 
Positive relation 
Positive relation - Regulator prospective 
Supervisors require that banks maintain minimal equity capital as protection for 
depositors and other stakeholders. Normally, banks are willing to hold higher level of 
capital which is well above the regulatory requirement (Berger et al., 2008). Although 
supervisory pressure may contribute to the capital buildup, but it also creates the 
environment that made market discipline more relevant to banks. The Third Pillar of 
Basel III specifies rules for expanded information disclosure to enhance the market 
disciplines on banks’ risk taking. Both Estrella (2004) and Benink and Wihlborg (2002) 
suggest that the supervision and market discipline are emphasized as necessary 
supplements to capital requirement.  
 
Regulators have assumed that a federal safety net distorts bank incentives to limit 
leverage, which indicates that supervisory capital standards will encourage bank to 
operate in high capital ratio. In addition, the increasing complexity of large banking 
organizations makes regulators difficult to monitor and control using traditional tools. 
But markets can recognize and influence a banks’ complex activity and can assess true 
condition. Therefore, market discipline can thus play an important role in bank 
supervision.  
 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) analyze the capital ratios using monthly regulatory data 
of large German banks and obtain the best fit to the optimal capital ratio of just above 
the regulatory minimum of 8%. Miles et al. (2013) find that the amount of equity 
capital that is likely to be desirable for banks to use is very much larger than banks 
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have used, and it also higher than targets agreed under the Basel III requirement in 
UK banks for the period from 1992 to 2010. In United States, Flannery and Rangan 
(2008) find that banks' capital ratios increased substantially during the 1990s, with 
banks holding capital levels that were 75% more than the regulatory minimums in the 
early 2000s. Berger et al. (2008) also find the similar evidence in US bank holding 
companies from 1992 to 2006. 
 
 
Positive relation - risk prospective 
There is general agreement that the risk classification determining bank capital 
requirement. Markets can recognize and influence bank default risk. Thus, bank 
capital ratios might reliably positively relate to portfolio risk exposures. Flannery and 
Giacomini (2015) demonstrating that large European banks’ reported regulatory 
capital measures often far exceeded their loss-absorbing capacity during 1997–2011. 
Bank risk exposures increase when banks are permitted to enter new, riskier lines of 
business. Risk aversion investors are likely requiring bank to adjust upward the 
capital ratio base on the risk level. Nier and Baumann (2006) find that while 
competition leads to greater risk taking incentives, market discipline is more effective 
in curbing these incentives. Curry et al. (2008) conclude that equity markets provide 
an economically substantive degree of independent assessment of banking company 
risk, thereby establishing the conditions for market discipline to be effective. Allen et 
al. (2014) conclude that bank hold a positive amount of equity capital as a way to 
reduce bankruptcy costs. 
 
 
Positive relation – market discipline improve governance, improve bank value, 
improve bank capital 
Large shareholders are potentially able to trade on private information that may help 
discipline management and improve corporate governance (Admati and Pfeiderer, 
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2009; Edmans et al., 2013). Traditional view is that large shareholder governs by 
influencing firms’ operation. Edmans et al. (2013) and Edmans and Manso (2009) 
show that governance from trading by blockholders leads to positive announcement 
returns and improvements in operating performance. Ferreira et al. (2011) claim that 
external market discipline and internal board monitoring are substitutes. Anginer et al. 
(2016) show that executive options and stock wealth invested in the bank is generally 
associated with better capitalization. 
 
Mehran and Thakor (2011) find that total bank value and bank’s equity capital are 
positively correlated in the cross-section.  
 
Positive relation – banking environment 
Capital buildup might be a rational response by market participants to changes in the 
banking environment. Lepetit et al. (2015) find that banks are likely to boost their 
capital ratios by issue equity without cutting lending when control and cash flow 
rights are identical from the sample of 341 European commercial banks during the 
2002 – 2010 period. Allen et al. (2011) claim that the market discipline is one of the 
forces that induces banks to hold positive capital because it allows higher borrower 
surplus. Allen et al. (2011) explain that borrowers prefer lower interest rates and 
higher capital as they do not bear the cost of the capital. Even there is deposit 
insurance, banks' incentives to monitor are reduced, but the market discipline still 
entail high capital level.  
 
 
Nier and Baumann (2006) find that stronger market discipline resulting from 
uninsured liabilities and disclosure creates larger capital buffers. 
 
Based on above arguments, market disciplinary forces can be the explanations 
contribute to the capital buildup. To sum up, there are several reasons why a bank that 
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is disciplined by the capital market should keep its capital ratio within a narrow high 
range. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of market discipline is positively associated with the level of 
bank capital. 
 
 
Negative relation 
The previous literature also provides rational explanations for low capital ratios. First, 
the pecking order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984) states that information 
asymmetries between bank managers and outside investors induce a preference order 
from internal capital through debt to equity financing. Information asymmetries about 
banks’ financial health can be relieved market monitoring. Strong external market 
discipline enables market participants to assess bank capital adequacy more efficiently. 
Therefore, this form of monitoring should be associated with lower external financing 
costs, thus increase the leverage.  
 
Second, bankers normally argue that an excessively high equity capital level has 
negative effect on their ability to compete. An increase in bank competition erodes the 
present value of the banks’ future rents, which lead to reducing the incentives to 
behave prudently.  
 
Third, liquidity production is a central function of banks. Greater bank capital reduces 
the probability of financial distress but also reduces liquidity creation (Diamond and 
Rajan, 2000). Distinguin et al. (2013) find that banks decrease their capital ratios 
when they face higher illiquidity. DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) claim that high leverage 
is optimal for banks in a model that has just enough frictions for banks to have a 
meaningful role in liquid claim production. Allen et al. (2014) show that equity capital 
is costly relative to deposit to provide liquidity.  
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Fourth, raising equity by issuing new shares may entail significant share price 
reductions and transaction cost. De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015) suggest that external 
governance has opposite effect on bank capital structure adjustments. 
 
Based on above arguments, market disciplinary forces can be the explanations 
contribute to the capital decrease. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of market discipline is negatively associated with the level of 
bank capital. 
 
 
Interaction between pin and eff 
Bank performance might contribute to the effect of market discipline on capital 
structure stronger. General investors have limited knowledge and skills that cannot 
become privately informed about every bank, thus they choose to trade banks that 
information is the most profitable. Management may respond to market assessments 
of company performance and changes capital strategies. If markets are efficient, it 
leads to changing equity market valuations reflecting market attitudes and 
expectations of bank profitability. Thus, better performed banks respond to stock 
prices as a source of information for monitoring management. Uninformed investors 
are likely to access an asset pool that has been cream-skimmed by informed investors 
(Bolton et al., 2016).  
 
Short selling can be an avenue that contributes to market discipline when bank 
underperforming. Large shareholders are more likely to sell their stake in a 
under-performing bank rather than bear the cost of intervening to fix. Such sales not 
only drive down the stock price, but also reducing the manager’s equity compensation 
and thus punishing them ex post. Anginer et al. (2016) show that executive options 
and stock wealth invested in the bank is generally associated with better capitalization. 
Manager is more sensitive to the short selling as their wealth is closely tied to the 
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stock price. Although market participates could be motivated purely to maximize their 
trading profits, but such actions have a social benefit by disciplining the manager. A 
bulk of the literature focuses on empirically testing the effect of short selling behavior 
from investors on company reaction. For instance, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) argue 
that, when the larger shareholders observe managers underperforming, they will exit 
early before the information becomes public. Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015) claim 
that the efficacy of exit as a governance mechanism by equity blockholders can be an 
effective market discipline. Fang et al. (2016) find that short selling or its prospects 
helps detect fraud and improves price efficiency. Massa et al. (2015) document a 
significantly negative relationship between the treat of short selling and earning 
management. Edmans et al. (2013) also provide evidence consistent with exit theories 
suggesting that trading by institutions is an effective governance mechanism. 
 
Bank performance has an important role to play in shaping the relation between 
market discipline and bank capital structure. When banks are undeforming, their 
capital ratio would difficult to adjust upwards. The idea is simply that banks with 
lower earnings can be expected to face higher costs of issuing equity and have less 
financial slack. Under-performed banks would adjust downwards their capital level in 
response to exogenous changes in market discipline by informed trading. In such 
situation, these banks cannot obtain a better price when issue new equity (De Jonghe 
and Oztekin (2015). In addition, managers are more likely to engage risky investment 
when bank underperforming. Curry et al. (2008) find that equity market information 
can improve bank supervision by adding value to forecast banks’ risk ratings.  
 
Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 3: Market discipline can reduce the capital ratio when bank 
underperforming.  
 
3 Methodology 
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3.1 Bank Capital 
The economist’s view of bank capital is the amount of equity that is financed by itself 
with. The regulatory view is similar but broader in that as regulatory capital typically 
includes other sources of financing such as preferred stock. As the variety of 
regulatory definitions of capital all assign a central role to equity, we will refer to 
bank capital simply as common equity (paid-in capital plus retained earnings) in the 
bank. Therefore, the ratio of equity to total assets (ETA) represents the bank capital 
and it is calculated by the equity position as a fraction to total asset of a bank. The 
ETA is commonly used to measure the level of bank capital in literature, such as 
Flannery and Giacomini (2015), De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015), and Lepetit et al. 
(2015). ETA is to capture the capital structure and risk preference across banks in 
terms of their equity requirement.  
 
In addition, we include an alternative measure for the bank capital, which is 
regulatory capital ratio. Normally banks need to hold more capital than the required 
regulatory minimum in order to reduce the likelihood of liquidation. So the regulatory 
capital is the amount of capital needed for a bank to be regarded as continues 
operation by depositors and other stakeholders. Following Lepetit et al. (2015) and 
Memmel and Raupach (2010), the regulatory capital ratio is defined as the bank’s 
core capital divided by the weighted average assets.  
 
3.2 Market discipline 
To measure market discipline level, the market microstructure model of Easley, Kiefer, 
and O’Hara (1996; 1997a; 1997b) is used to generate the PIN. The PIN is a measure 
of market disciplinary that exists from stock market. It reflects a firm-specific 
estimate of the probability that investors trade from privately information; hence, it 
directly captures the extent of information among investors in the capital market. In 
addition, the model focuses on the mechanism through which the market participants 
observe updated trading and draw inferences about the true value of an asset. If the 
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private information is being reflected on relevant transactions and the market 
participant updates their beliefs, then the trading price will be affected. In continuous 
time, the full information converges into the process of trading, learning and pricing. 
 
In Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara’ model (EKO), it is assumed that news event2 occurs 
independently with probability 𝛼. When an information event occurs, it is either bad 
or good news, the probability are 𝛿 and 1 – 𝛿 respectively. Therefore the bad news 
event occurs at probability 𝛼𝛿, and good news event occurs with probability 𝛼(1 −
 𝛿). During each trading day, orders from market participants are assumed to arrive 
according the Poisson process. The informed traders arrive at rate 𝜇 regardless 
whether good or bad news3. Sell and buy orders from uninformed traders would arrive 
at rate 𝜀𝑠 and 𝜀𝑏 respectively. According to EKO, the likelihood function induced 
by this simple model of the trade process for a single trade day is given as follow: 
 
L (θ ｜B, S) = (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑠
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝛼𝛿 ∙ 𝑒−𝜀𝑏
𝜀𝑏
𝐵
𝐵!
∙ 𝑒−(𝜇+𝜀𝑠)
(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑠)
𝑆
𝑆!
+ 𝛼(1 − 𝛿)
∙ 𝑒−(𝜇+𝜀𝑏)
(𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏)
𝐵
𝐵!
𝑒−𝜀𝑠
𝜀𝑠
𝑆
𝑆!
 
(Equation 1) 
As the likelihood function is a mixture of distribution, those three elements refer to 
the likelihood weighted by the probability of a day with “no event day” (1 –α), a “bad 
news day” (αδ), and a “good news day”(𝛼(1 − 𝛿)). The (Bi, Si) is the total number 
of buys and sells in a single date for period i ∈ (1, … . , I) and the θ =  (α,μ,εb,εs,δ) 
is the parameter vector. All we needed to generate these parameters is to input the 
number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated. However, trade and quote databases do 
not provide the number of seller-initiated or buyer-initiated in each day. The validity 
of our study that classifies trades as buyer-initiated and seller-initiated depends on the 
accuracy of the classification method. Consistent with Lai et al. (2014), the Lee and 
                                                             
2 The events could relate to private information of which the firm is aware or unknown, such as releasing new 
competitive product or adverse change legal environment.  
3 The EKO model assumes that either informed buying or selling order occur on the same data.  
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Ready (1991)4 trade classification algorithm is being used to identify the trades. Ellis 
et al. (2000), Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Odders-White (2000) examine the 
validity of Lee and Ready algorithms and find that this method correctly classifies 
81.5%, 93% and 85% of the trade, depending of the sample period and market 
studied.  
 
Assuming sufficient independence conditions are held across a trading day, the 
likelihood function for the period is 
V = L (θ ｜M) = ∏ L (θ｜Bi, Si )
n
i=1
 
(Equation 2) 
Here M = {(Bi, Si)}i=1
I  refers to the data set. This maximizing the likelihood will 
give us the ML estimator for θ, from which we can estimate the probability that the 
trade is information-based as follows: 
PIN =
𝛼𝜇
𝛼𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠
 
(Equation 3) 
The denominator 𝛼𝜇 + 𝜀𝑏 + 𝜀𝑠 is the arrival rate for all orders which includes the 
informed and uninformed. The numerator 𝛼𝜇 is the arrival rate for information-based 
orders. Therefore the PIN equals the fraction of trades in a given day that arise from 
informed trading. This model interprets normal trading activities as uninformed trades 
and the abnormal trade as informed trades. There may have two concerns about the 
model, simplistic and not consider volume factor.  
 
There are several reasons to choose PIN as proxies of market discipline. First, it 
captures the characteristic of each transaction on the microstructure economic 
environment. Easely et al. (2002) use PIN in the asset pricing and found that this 
                                                             
4 The Lee and Ready (1991) method is the classification on each trade by compare the transaction price and the 
midpoint of the current bid and ask price. A trade would classify as a buy (sell) if the transaction price is closer to 
the prevailing ask (bid) quote. If the current transaction price equal to the midpoint, the previous transaction price 
would be used. A trade would classify as a buy (sell) if the transaction price is higher (lower) than the previous 
price. Next previous transaction price is being used if the current and previous transaction prices are the same. 
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measure is priced, higher PIN stocks earns higher expected return. Vega (2006) finds 
that stocks with high PIN are smaller reactions with earnings announcement, which 
suggest that those stocks likely contain more private information by speculators. 
Second, full information can converge by the process of trading and learning from 
trading results in prices (Easley and O’Hara, 1992). Therefore, a high PIN helps the 
market become more efficient. Third, compare to other proxies of market forces, such 
as spread-based, abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness, PIN is more 
accurate for using the decision by all stock investor rather than individual report or 
analysts. To classify the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades for listed 
company is more direct and comprehensive on reflecting the probability of informed 
trading in a dynamic view of market. 
 
3.3 Bank performance 
The most common efficiency estimations in banking are nonparametric techniques, 
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), and parametric techniques, such as the 
distribution-free approach (DFA) and stochastic frontier approach (SFA). The main 
difference between DEA and SFA is how they separate the measure of efficiency for 
an individual bank from random errors. DEA has the disadvantage of not allowing for 
random error associated with luck and other measurement errors. So we use SFA to 
measure efficiency, which considers measurement errors as well as other random 
factors in the estimation of efficiency. It was developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and 
Meeusen et al. (1977). This method has been widely applied to the banking sector to 
evaluate cost and profit efficiency theoretically and empirically (Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger et al., 2009a; Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and 
Mamatzakis, 2009; Jiang et al., 2013). SFA has been criticized for the 
predetermination of functional form and the distributional assumptions for the 
residual and efficiency score. However, separating the random error and efficiency 
score would more appropriate in the efficiency literatures in transition economies 
(Fries and Taci, 2005).  
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Suppose that total cost for each bank in each time period is given by: 
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑍𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 4) 
where TP denotes observed profit after tax for bank i at year t. P is a vector of input 
prices, Y is a vector of outputs, and Z stands for a set of control variables (fixed 
netputs). This approach disentangles the error term in two components. The first (v), 
corresponds to the random fluctuations, and is assumed to follow a symmetric normal 
distribution around the frontier, capturing all phenomena beyond the control of 
management. The second (u), accounts for bank’s inefficiency relative to the frontier 
and is assumed here to follow a truncated normal distribution. Profit efficiency 
measures the extent to which an individual’s profit fall below the profit of the best 
performance bank under same condition. Profit efficiency is based on a more 
reasonable economic goal of profit maximization and explains errors on both the 
output and the input sides (Sun et al. 2013). 
 
For the issue concerns the choice of functional form, translog function form has been 
commonly applied in the bank efficiency studies (Fu et al., 2014a, Uchida and Satake, 
2009 and Beccalli et al., 2006). Another Fourier-flexible form has gained banking 
literature attention as it offers a better global approximation of the unknown function 
without misspecification (Vennet, 2002). But Altunbas and Chakravraty (2001) 
suggest that the problem would with the Fourier-flexible function when dealing with 
heterogeneous data sets. Berger and Mester (1997) argue that the difference between 
the translog form and Fourier-flexible form are not cause serious inconsistence. So the 
translog form has been chosen, the SFA efficiency is based on the following function: 
ln 𝑇𝑃  = 𝛼𝑖0 + ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖
𝑖
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗
𝑗
+
𝑖
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗
𝑗
+
𝑖
 
1
2
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𝑖
+
1
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𝑗
+
𝑖
1
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𝑗
+
𝑖
 
1
2
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗
𝑖
+  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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(Equation 5) 
 
where TP is the logarithm of the profit before tax, Pi are input prices, Yi are output 
quantities. Zi are control variables. For the definition of bank inputs and outputs, the 
intermediation approach proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1997) is applied. The banks 
collect fund through labor and physical capital, and transfer to the loans and other 
earning assets. So there are two inputs, labour and financial capital, and two outputs; 
loans and other earning assets. These two output variables are commonly used in the 
previous researches, such as Berger et al. (2009a) and Bonin et al. (2005). Due to 
unavailable for the personal expense data, we following Jiang et al. (2009) and Fu et 
al. (2014a), the ratio of operating expenses to average assets is used as the price of 
labour. The price of financial capital is dividing the total interest expenses by total 
interest bearing borrowed funds. Greater organizations complexity may be associated 
with lower efficiency, so two bank-specific control variables are being employed to 
account for size different associated with banks, which are the amount of total earning 
assets and fixed assets.  
 
To ensure that the estimated frontier is well behaved, standard homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions are imposed. All variables except for input price are normalized 
by total asset, which imposes linear homogeneity to ensure that the cost-minimizing 
or profit-maximizing do not changes if all inputs prices are multiplied by the same 
positive scalar.  
 
Panel (b) in Table (1) presents the summary statistics of the used variables in 
stochastic frontier approach. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.4 Main model specification and variable construction 
To disentangle the relationship among capital, information risk and efficiency leads 
on, the system of equations estimated is as follows: 
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐼𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (Equation 6) 
22 
 
 
where ETA represents the level of capital and calculated by equity to average asset. 
The PIN is proxy for the market discipline, which calculates by Easley et al. (1997a, b) 
market microstructure model. CEFF represent bank cost inefficient and proxy for 
bank performance. The interaction term between PIN and CEFF is being included to 
test hypothesis 3. Lastly, X i,t refers to a list of control variables which includes bank 
specific characteristics and macro market control. 
 
For other control variables, we use a range of bank and market specific variables that 
are consider being important in explaining the relationship among the market 
discipline and capital. First, the logarithm of total asset (LNTA) is being used to 
control the firm size. Larger banks are holding more diversify asset portfolio and gain 
the size advantage than smaller bank (Hughes et al., 2001). Yet Berger et al. (1987) 
provide evidence that very large bank often encounter scale inefficiencies. We expect 
this variable to negatively impact the variation in the capital level because larger bank 
experienced lower expected costs of raising new equity and enjoy conjectural 
government guarantees. In addition, banks with high earnings may choose maintain 
higher equity capital ratios. This motive is likely to be amplified by the degree of risk 
aversion among bank management. However, high earning indicates that bank will be 
easy to raise new capital in future. Therefore, higher earnings would be associated 
with a lower capital ratio. We use earning per share (EPS) to control the impact from 
fluctuation of earnings on capital. Third, the ratio of total deposits to total loans 
(DEPTOL) assesses the degree to which customer loans are financed by customer 
deposits, and is related to the bank's liquidity. DEPTOL is expected to be positive 
with capital, since holding more liquid assets is usually accompanies with higher risk, 
therefore lead higher level of capital. 
 
Two market specific variables are also including for controlling the macroeconomic 
development characteristic of the Mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan. The impact 
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of macroeconomic environment may be more important for financial institutions than 
for non-financial firms because banks’ exposure to business cycle fluctuations 
obviously. These variables are commonly used in the banking literature (De Jonghe 
and Oztekin, 2015). First, inflation (INF) also uses to capture market characteristics. 
Bank fee on customer would increase in high-inflation environment, but due loans 
may accumulated and lead to higher risk. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) found that the 
inflation can determine the bank performance in Greek market. In addition, lending 
interest rate (LINT) uses to capture the differences of regulatory regime and monetary 
policy in these three markets. Third, a dummy variable (PCRISIS) of financial crisis 
(years 2008–2015) to capture the impact of the global financial crisis. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
 
4 Data 
4.1 Data sources 
In this study, we examine a region sample of banks over the 2006–2015 period. The 
sample cover the listed banks5 in three capital markets, Mainland China, Hongkong 
and Taiwan. The financial data regarding income statement and balance sheet 
information on individual banks is from Bankscope (Fitch’s International Bank 
Database). Given that our focus on listed commercial banks in stock exchanges of 
Mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan market, we start by excluding central banks, 
investment banks, policy banks, securities houses, multilateral government banks, 
non-banking credit institutions, and specialized government financial institutions. For 
estimate efficiency, we exclude banks that have the following features: (1) missing 
values for profit before tax, (2) missing, negative or zero value for inputs and outputs, 
and (3) missing value for control variables (total assets and fixed assets). In addition, 
duplicate information is being eliminated. If Bankscope shows both unconsolidated 
and consolidated financial statements, we use consolidated statement to analysis 
                                                             
5 As PIN needs to be calculated from daily trading data, so the unlisted banks are excluded.  
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(except, of course, for banks that do not consolidate their data and do not belong to a 
consolidated group), because as capital requirements are imposed at the consolidated 
group level. The scope of the risks contained in consolidated statement is broader, as 
information about those banking subsidiaries operating outside Great China is 
included. Furthermore, most of the banks in Mainland China previous follow the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) while some banks, including the joint 
ventures and banks listed in the stock market, also prepared annual reports based on 
the Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS). However, the CAS was developed 
following the principles of IAS starting in 2006. Therefore, we compare the financial 
statements of the same bank in Mainland China which reports under both the CAS 
and IAS and do not find a major difference. The quality of data in China is often 
questioned and criticism, so data from multiple sources have been checked carefully. 
 
Another problem we faced in this sample of bank-level is that Bankscope reports 
financial statement data at the aggregated level. The impact of bank mergers during 
the period has also to be taken into account, especially in Taiwan market. The 
aggregated statements are combining a group of affiliated banks that have merged or 
expect to merge. These banks are neither having financial links nor form a legal entity. 
Therefore, a given bank might be presented several times in Bankscope. Micco et al. 
(2007) proposed two methods to deal with banks that have aggregated statements. The 
first is using the aggregated statement and drop the observation for the individual 
banks. The second is using individual banks up to the time of merger, and then 
starting from the year of merger, with the new bank. Following Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011), we use first method and work with the aggregated statements. In 
addition, a similar problem arises for banks which, having belonged at t-1 to a 
consolidated group, leave such group at t. To calculate both the averages of certain 
variables, the figure at t-1 is obtained from their individually reported financial 
statements. 
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In order to calculate PIN, our sample is restricted to publicly-listed banks because we 
require high-frequency transaction data from stock market. The high-frequency data 
represents trades and quotes submitted during the regular trading hours of each listed 
bank. The high-frequency transaction data for banks in Mainland China are from the 
GTA Information Technology Company Limited. GTA Information Technology 
Company Limited is a local data provider that collects all the Chinese listed company 
transaction data. The transaction data for banks in Hongkong are from Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). HKEx is a leading global operator of 
exchanges and clearing houses based in Hongkong. The transaction data for banks in 
Taiwan are from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). TEJ is a financial data collection 
and content processing company which focuses mainly on Taiwan stock exchange. 
Our transaction data include all trades and quotes submitted to the stock exchanges of 
three markets from January 2006 through December 2015. Those three data sources 
provide information on trade qualifiers. Besides, trades identified as irregular trades 
or with negative trading prices are excluded. 
 
In our study, three markets of stock exchanges have implemented automated 
electronic trading system during our sample period from January 2006 to December 
2015. In this manner, a full business cycle of the Great China economy is included, a 
point of particular importance given that the aim of this paper is to analysis whether 
there is a relationship between the market discipline driven from stock market and the 
capital held by financial institutions. 
 
In addition to the bank-specific data and stock market information, we use two 
macroeconomic variables to control for a country’s macroeconomic environment and 
overall level of economic development. These are the rate of inflation of consumer 
prices and lending interest rate. These data are obtained from Datastream, which is 
managed by Thompson Financial Limited.  
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The initial sample contained 468 bank level observations for PIN measure. We merge 
these observations with efficiency data calculated by using SFA. For those 
observations that cannot be matched by efficiency, we manually matched by firm 
names. Therefore, our panel is incomplete since new listed banks have started to 
operate during the period considered while others have ceased to exist.  
 
As shown in Table (3), some years have more observations than others due to new 
IPO, delisted, or acquisition during the sample period. Next, we apply the filters for 
firm specific information and macroeconomic information. After filtering, the 
dimension of the data set is 385 observations and 46 banks for the period of 
2006-2012. The number of banks and the number of bank-year observations are the 
highest from Taiwan market, with 23 banks and 198 observations (making up 51.42% 
of the number of observation). Mainland China market is ranked second with 16 
banks and 129 observations (making up 33.51% of the number of observation). 
Remaining Hongkong market has 7 banks and 58 observations. The observations are 
distributed relatively evenly over years 2010–2014 in the sample, but years 2006–
2009 have fewer observations. Table (3) reports the distribution for our sample.  
 
Using panel data methodology is not only controls for individual heterogeneity, but 
also reduces concerns associated with multicollinearity and estimation bias, and 
specifies the time-varying relation between dependent and independent variables 
(Baltagi, 2008). Thus, our study employs a panel data methodology and an F-test is 
used to determine whether the fixed-effects model outperforms the pooled OLS. In 
addition, the appropriateness of the random-effects model relative to the pooled OLS 
model is examined with the Breusche and Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. 
Finally, Hausman’s test is used to compare the fixed-effects model with the 
random-effects model.  
 
 [TABLE 3 HERE] 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table (4) presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. The 
key variables in our analysis are the proxies for the bank capital structure and market 
discipline. 
 
For the full sample, as banks are highly leveraged; the mean (median) capital asset 
ratio (ETA) is 9.56% (9.2%) with a standard deviation of 2.9%. The mean of 
regulatory capital (REG) is 9.6%, comfortably above the minimum Basel requirement 
of 8%, with a standard deviation of 3.9%. There is much greater variation in the ratio 
of equity to average assets. The pattern is similar as the study of Williams (2004) who 
examines the relationship between bank risk and efficiency for European banks. 
These two measures of banks’ capital level represent different capital structure 
dynamics and one should be cautious in interpreting and generalizing results obtained 
with each measure. 
 
Our estimated PIN variable has a mean of 0.17 and ranges from 0.05 to 0.65. This 
mean of PIN is comparable to previous studies. Easley et al. (2002) find that the mean 
of PIN is 0.19 in New York Stock Exchange. More recently, Lai et al. (2014) use a 
larger dataset from 47 countries worldwide to exam the pricing effect of PIN, they 
estimate that the mean of PIN in Mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan are 0.10, 
0.20 and 0.23 respectively. As the participants of Chinese equity markets are 99.5% 
by individual investor investors (Ng and Wu, 2006), so it is plausible for the lower 
PIN in these markets because individual investors have less information advantage 
compare to institution investors. While the PIN estimates are in the same order of 
magnitude, the frustrating in the PIN estimate probably reflects the increasing 
financial transparency of Mainland China markets and the implementation of an 
automated trading system. 
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Besides, the mean of cost inefficiency is 0.07, which same as the cost efficiency in 
Sun et al. (2013) study. The sample of Sun (2013) covers 8 years’ period 2002-2010 in 
Mainland China. For other control variables, the asset size is highly skewed to the 
right as banks in the top quartile are several times bigger than median size banks. 
Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (LNTA) to measure bank size 
to reduce the effect of skewness on our results. The average natural logarithm of the 
total assets is 18.27. The deposit to loan ratio (DEPTOL) ranges from 0.77 to 1.87, 
with an average of 1.23. The median DEPTOL ratio is 1.21, with a lower degree of 
variation across banks. The earing per share ratio (EPS) ranges from -0.52 to 1.85, 
with an average of 0.12. All these various checks reinforce our level of confidence in 
the accuracy of our estimated variables. 
 [TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The correlation matrix of correlations between the variables is shows on Table (5). 
The correlation between market discipline (PIN) and capital ratio (ETA) is 0.147 and 
significant at 5% level, which suggests that banks with intensive market disciplinary 
are likely buildup their capital. Besides, the correlation between the regulatory ratio 
(REG) and PIN is 0.1845 and significant in 5% level, while correlation between the 
REG and ETA is negative and insignificant. The bank inefficiency (CEFF) and ETA 
variables have a correlation of -0.190 and not significant, while the CEFF and REG 
variables have a correlation of 0.1845 and significant at 5% level. This suggests that 
the inefficient bank may hold higher level of bank capital. The correlation between 
CEFF and PIN is not very higher, only -0.099, in absolute value not more than 9%.   
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Table (5) further shows that the correlation between the ETA and bank size (LNTA) is 
negative at -0.193 and significant, while correlation between the REG and LNTA is 
positive and insignificant. This suggests that the economic impact of bank size on 
capital level may be opposite. In addition, the negative relation between PIN and bank 
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size (LNTA) is consistent with previous empirical studies, such as Vega (2006), which 
use PIN as an informed trading measure. 
 
Overall, most of the value drivers considered exhibit a statistically significant 
correlation, so there are no strong correlations between the variables forming our 
models and the risk of multicollinearity is very low. 
 
 
5 Empirical results 
5.1 Market discipline affects bank capital 
Table (5) contains estimation results for the baseline model for the full sample using 
ETA as dependent variable from Equation (6). It presents results of regressions of 
proxies for market discipline over bank capital variables, and a set of bank-level and 
country-level control variables. All columns of Table (5) report include year effect 
except column (1). In addition, those results are estimated with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. 
 
To start with, column (1) of Table (5) includes market discipline variable only. The 
coefficient of market discipline (PIN) is positively significant at the 1% level, the 
termed slope shifter is 0.040. More specifically, an increase of one percentage point in 
market discipline by informed trading (of 0.10 from Table 4) increases the long-term 
relative capital ratio by around 0.4% (0.040 * 0.10). Regarding the significance and 
sign of the coefficient of market discipline, we find that, after controlling for other 
determinants, there is a clearly significant (at 1%) positive relationship between the 
capital ratio and the market discipline. Accordingly, in the case of Great China, capital 
structure barely sensitive to the stock market have translated into relatively bank 
capital buildup. 
 
Then, we include variables capturing bank specific characteristics without bank 
30 
 
inefficiency and interaction term in column (2) of Table (5). The coefficient of PIN is 
still positive, while only 10% significant level and the termed slope shifter is 0.018. 
This suggests that an increase of one percentage point in market discipline by 
informed trading increases the capital ratio by around 0.18% (0.018 * 0.10). 
 
Furthermore, we further include bank inefficiency and interaction term in column (3) 
of Table (5). The coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at 10% level, and 
the termed slope shifter is 0.058. This suggests that an increase of one percentage 
point in market discipline increases the capital ratio by around 0.58% (0.058 * 0.10). 
 
Finally, we present the full model with the bank specific and macroeconomic 
development variables in column (4) of Table (5). Again, the coefficient of PIN is still 
positive and significant at 10% level, and the termed slope shifter is 0.070. This 
suggests that an increase of one percentage point in market discipline increases the 
capital ratio by around 0.70% (0.070 * 0.10). Results show that controlling for other 
market characteristics does not change the effect qualitatively. As mentioned above, 
changes in macroeconomic development variables are controlled with inflation rate 
(INF), lending interest rate (LINT) and post crisis dummy (POSTD). 
 
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Overall, the coefficients of PIN from column (1) to (4) of Table (5) are positively and 
statistically at the 1% or 5% significance level. This positive relation shows that a 
higher (lower) market discipline may lead to a high (low) bank capital. This finding 
supports our hypothesis (1). Our finding consistent with the conjecture that bank 
managers under market pressure would make proactive efforts to converge to their 
target capital ratio. 
 
This positive relation between market discipline and capital level can be explained by 
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several reasons. First, since the market discipline can affect a firm’s corporate 
governance through trading, firm with strong governance are associated with better 
performance and high profitability of informed trading. The trading brings new 
information on the true value of a stock to discipline bank managers. Thus, the 
effectiveness of banking firm governance also could be affected by information 
environment from stock market. Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that the openness to 
the market for corporate control leads to strong market discipline, which is more 
informative stock prices by encouraging collection of and trading on private 
information. Banks clearly appear to have different governance structures than 
non-financial institutions, which not only intensive regulation but also higher leverage. 
As suggest by Bhagat and Bolton (2008), better corporate governance have positive 
impact on bank profitability. Mehran and Thakor (2011) claim that a positive relation 
between bank value and capital. Therefore, the increase in capitalization simply 
reflect a retained earnings of bank profitability. Bank have a more conservative profile 
tend to hold higher capital to meet potential adverse shocks. Besides, manager is less 
willing to pay dividends, capital ratios thus have risen ‘‘passively’’. Indeed, higher 
capital is associated with higher lending, higher liquidity creation, higher bank values, 
and higher probabilities of surviving crises (Thakor, 2014). 
 
Second, the effect of ownership could also play an important role in bank capital 
adjust. Holmstrom and Tirol (1993) claim that a firm's ownership structure influences 
the value of market monitoring through its effect on market liquidity. If the 
controlling shareholder is a state or family rather than widely held institution, the 
incentive for expropriation could be stronger. Those controlling shareholders would 
injection fund during hard times to avoid their failure with the expectation of 
extracting benefit in the future. As stock market can play an important role in 
monitoring management, banks with a strong orientation towards shareholder value 
are likely to keep the capital ratio in relatively higher level. Although a decrease in the 
capital ratio seems desirable, as it may increase the ROE, but at it may also cause cost 
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of rating downgrades and rising debt spreads. Banks with excess control rights were 
presumably under greater market discipline pressure to adjust their capital ratio 
upward (Lepetit et al., 2015). 
 
Third, market discipline can influence a bank’s risk management function (Barakat et 
al., 2014). Stronger market discipline should be applied to banks that are at greater 
risk of failure. Although the senior management and board of directors play an 
important role in bank risk management, but market discipline is effective in 
providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default, by holding capital buffers 
against adverse outcomes (Nier and Baumann, 2006). The evolution of bank income 
toward an emphasis on non-interest revenue has also seen a structural change in bank, 
which may lead to higher risk-taking. Excessive risk taking may led to significant loss 
during financial crisis period. William (2014) find that external governance and higher 
capital regulations both act to reduce bank-level risk. Banks can improve risk controls 
function due the pressure of market discipline when choose to undertake high risk 
investment. High level of capital would increase a bank’s chances of survival and 
withstanding major negative shocks. In the event of a crisis, the lower the capital ratio 
is, the higher the probability that a bank will fail to pay back its debts. Miles et al. 
(2013) conclude that the amount of equity funding that is likely to be desirable for 
banks to use is very much larger than banks have had in recent years, and it also 
higher than minimum target requirement set by regulator. As the separation of 
ownership and control raises question of managers' incentives to take actions in the 
best interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), so the managers have 
incentive to choose disclosure policy which may not fully reflect the risk taking of 
bank. Regulator may not able to monitor the ‘moral hazard’ problem and hence cannot 
fully control banks’ risk taking incentive. So, the market force would discipline bank 
managers, who actively rebalance their capital structure to converge excessive risk 
taking.  
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Fourth, Nier and Baumann (2006) find that stronger market discipline from more 
disclosure increase capital buffers. Regulator should foster disclosure information and 
private-sector monitoring of banks (Barth et al., 2004). Estrella (2004) also suggest 
that market discipline through information disclosure can be supplemented with other 
tools for bank supervision. A bank with higher information asymmetry may indicates 
that less information being released or selective disclosure. Brown and Hillegeist 
(2007) suggest that the negative relation between disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry. A disclosure is a signal that contains information on future investment, 
future cash flows, and expectation of earnings. However, there is more informative 
the signal if greater the expenditure on disclosure and leakage of strategic information. 
Thus, banks may not be willing to disclosure certain information. Besides, those 
hiding information could represent poor asset quality or high portion of 
nonperforming loans, in turn raising the bank risk. A failing bank can be seemed as 
one that has insufficient capital while excess risk taking. The regulation on bank asset 
restriction has limited effective given the high leverage ratios of banks. In addition, 
higher information asymmetry may indicate lower quality information disclosure by 
firms. It creates a potentially constructive role for government interventions to offset 
the market failures and enhance social cost. Thus, information asymmetry is crucial in 
determining the possibility of market discipline both at the individual level and the 
systemic level. Especially for banking sector, information asymmetry prone 
contagious and socially costly. Base on the information provided by the bank about its 
level of capital, the authorities should consider whether allow the bank continually 
operate. Thus, banks should provide more accurate and value-relevant information 
regarding the risk management function to the regulator and public. Therefore, 
regulators may focus on the capital adequacy to maintain the stability of financial 
system by require bank to enhance their capital level. 
 
More importantly, the combination of opaque assets composition and deposit 
liabilities make banks potentially vague. So, bank may also ‘‘cherry-pick’’ its 
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information disclosure, for instance, accelerate disclosing the gains on appreciated 
asset portfolio while postponing recognition of unrealized losses. Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) suggest that bank with higher level of capital have better chance to 
survival during a banking crisis. The benefit come because a larger buffer of 
loss-absorbing capital limit the chance of financial crises as history events. Setting the 
adequate level of capital is a major policy issue for banking regulators. Therefore, 
regulator would encourage banks to raise the capital when information asymmetry 
increase. Regulatory pressure plays an important role in banks’ control of the level of 
capital. The Basel III framework also require banks come to use more equity capital to 
finance their assets than was required under previous sets of requirement. 
 
The pecking order theory argue that the asymmetric information problem drives the 
capital structure (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Information asymmetries 
between bank managers and outsider investors induces a preference order from 
internal capital via debt to equity issuing. Agency costs arise from a conflict of 
interest between shareholders and managers when shareholders cannot effectively 
monitor senior management. The cost includes structuring, monitoring and holding a 
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In 
addition, there is some disadvantage for internal capital, which may have the risk of 
being misused for private benefit of managers. Moreover, bank may have insufficient 
surplus cash during the crisis. However, the effect of these problems can be partially 
neutralized by adjust capital. Memmel and Raupach (2010) suggest that banks with a 
higher level of proprietary trading are more likely to adjust upwards their capital ratio. 
High information asymmetry costs result in difficulty on external financing, which in 
turn lead to issue equity capital. In addition, the optimal bank capital trades off three 
effects, more capital increase the rent, increase the buffer against shocks, and changes 
the amount that can be extracted from borrowers (Diamond and Rajan, 2000). The 
cost of intermediation of saving through the banking system might offset the benefit 
of maintain a larger buffer of capital. That would tend to reduce the level of 
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investment, which have potentially long-term effects on real economy. Furthermore, 
the socially efficient capital level may exceed banks' optimal capital levels, market 
discipline would become germane to minimize the system risk. To sum up, there are 
several reasons why a bank that is increase capital level when strong market discipline 
in place.  
 
Our results are consistent with Allen et al. (2011), who argue that an important factor 
in inducing banks to choose higher capital is market discipline. Besides, Barrios and 
Blanco (2003) also find that market discipline lead banks to hold higher capital than 
other factors. Furthermore, Nier and Baumann (2006) conclude that market discipline 
is more effective to limit bank risk by choosing a larger capital buffer. Curry et al. 
(2008) also claim that markets can provide useful information to bank supervisors and 
become a channel for market discipline to be effective in restraining risky behaviors 
of institutions. A bank has a number of typical choices when raising its capital; it can 
raise funds from existing shareholders, or issue new shares via the domestic capital 
market, or alternatively it can source funds via the international capital markets. 
 
Some criticisms for banks to operate with more capital is that banks would be forced 
to reduce liquidity and lead to impair their competitive advantage. However, the lost 
liquidity is likely to be significantly lower than the cost to taxpayers of bailing out 
inadequately-capitalized failing banks. Diamond and Rajan (2001) proposed that the 
fragility associated with low bank capital is necessary for banks to create liquidity. 
 
Our result is contrast with the finding of Both Petacchi (2015) and Agarwal and 
O’Hara (2007), which find that strong market discipline from higher information 
asymmetry have higher leverage and support the pecking order theory. However, there 
is a major difference between our study, and Petacchi (2015) and Agarwal and O’Hara 
(2007). The observation of Petacchi (2015) includes not only financial firms, but also 
non-financial firms, while Agarwal and O’Hara (2007) exclude financial firms.  
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Both column (3) and (4) of Table (6) include the bank inefficiency (CEFF) the 
interaction between PIN and CEFF that estimate from stochastic frontier approach. 
However, both bank inefficiency and interaction term is not statistically significant. In 
addition, we briefly describing the set of control variables. Bank size (LNTA) is not 
correlated with capital in first three columns but is negatively correlated with this 
variable in column (4). This negative relation suggests that larger bank has a relatively 
lower level of capital. This is consistent with the finding of Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), larger banks are associated with lower capital level. Lower capital is generally 
associated with higher bank risk. It is argued that in the developing markets as 
Mainland China, a higher probability being attached to the likelihood of bailout for 
larger banks. Thus, large banks find the risk seeking incentives from being too big to 
fail reinforced. Earning per share (EPS) is not correlated with bank capital in all 
specifications.  
 
Fixed effect  
To formally test how firm fixed effect makes a difference to our results, we use the 
firm fixed effect estimate to confirm our previous finding. We allow for residuals of 
the firms to be correlated over time. Bank capital structure can be explained by time 
invariant firm specific effect i.e. a firm fixed effect (Gropp and Heider, 2010). These 
fixed effects can be correlated with other observed variables and bias the estimates.  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
First, we include market discipline, bank inefficiency, interaction term between PIN 
and CEFF, and bank specific control variables in column (1) of Table (7). Again, the 
coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at 5% level, and the termed slope 
shifter is 0.063. Increased market discipline results in a context in which managers are 
less likely to enjoy a quiet life and encourages more bank-specific capital strategies. 
In addition, the coefficient of CEFF is positive and significant at 10% level, indicating 
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that bank efficiency has a negative effect on the level of capital. Low profitable, and 
inefficient banks have higher capital ratios. The result is contrast with the finding De 
Jonghe and Oztekin (2015). Furthermore, the interaction term is negative and 
significant at 5% level, which suggest that market discipline may reduce bank capital 
for those low efficient banks. This is implied by Hypothesis 3. However, the result 
should be handled with care as it may be driven by covariate: better performing banks 
tend to have a higher level of market discipline, at the same time, they tend to adjust 
their capital ratio frequently. The capital market effectively subjects banks to a capital 
requirement, which brings their preference closer in alignment with those of the 
authorities, and reduces the level of social losses in event of bank failure.  
 
Then, we present the full model with the bank specific and macroeconomic 
development variables in column (2) of Table (7). Again, the coefficient of PIN is still 
positive and significant at 10% level, and the termed slope shifter is 0.045. In addition, 
the coefficient of CEFF is also positive and significant at 10% level. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of interaction term is negative and significant at 5% level. These results 
suggest that market discipline is a more effective to enhance bank capital level when 
bank perform efficiently. 
 
Finally, we present the full model with year dummy in column (3) of Table (7). Again, 
the coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at 1% level, and the termed slope 
shifter is 0.068. In addition, the coefficient of CEFF is also positive and significant at 
10% level. Furthermore, the coefficient of interaction term is negative and significant 
at 1% level. 
 
Overall, results of Table (7) shows that controlling for firm fixed effect, and other 
bank and market characteristics does not change the effect qualitatively. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are qualitatively unchanged, despite the significance 
decreased for some variables. All four coefficients of PIN are positively and 
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statistically at the 5% or 10% significance level. Again, these findings still show that 
banks with strong market discipline are associated with higher level of capital. 
 
Random effect  
First, we include market discipline, bank inefficiency, interaction term between PIN 
and CEFF, and bank specific control variables in column (1) of Table (8). Again, the 
coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at 1% level, and the termed slope 
shifter is 0.071. However, both the coefficient of CEFF and interaction term are not 
significant. 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
Then, we present the full model with year dummy in column (2) of Table (8). Again, 
the coefficient of PIN is still positive and significant at 1% level, and the termed slope 
shifter is 0.068. In addition, we find a negative and statistically significant interaction 
variable coefficient. Although the coefficient of CEFF is not significant, but the 
coefficient of PIN negative and significant.  
 
However, the R square values are both not very high. This is not surprising because 
the existing literature (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997) shows that many factors, such as 
organizational forms and the bank’s characteristics, may influence the bank capital 
strategy. Another limitation of our analysis is the measure of market discipline. Due to 
data availability, we only use PIN as the sole discipline measurement.  
 
 
6 Robustness test 
We perform several regressions to check for the robustness of our results obtained in 
Sections 5. The causality could also go in the opposite direction from bank capital to 
market discipline. The share price would go up for the higher level capital and 
efficient bank compare with counterparties, thus these bank may attracts more 
attention in the capital market. Therefore, the trading volume would increase when 
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more investor trade, so the more information would aggregate from trading. This 
would affect the level of market discipline. Another challenge is unobservable 
heterogeneity across banks, which definitively exists in these three similar markets. 
 
The previous results, although favorable to the disciplining hypothesis, may be 
subject to the same issue of endogeneity. Although FE model addresses endogeneity 
due to unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneities, but does not take account of the 
endogeneity problems due to time-varying heterogeneities, simultaneity, or reverse 
causality. Therefore, we use IV-2SLS and dynamic GMM to further address these 
econometric challenges.  
 
6.1 IV-2SLS estimation 
IV-2SLS is a standard methodology used to address the endogeneity problem in 
empirical corporate finance research. Under standard identification assumptions, we 
apply 2SLS methods to isolate the effect of PIN on capital.  
 
A valid instrument must meet two criteria: a strong correlation with the instrumented 
specific independent variables and orthogonality with the error term. That is, the 
instrument should be a variable that can be excluded from the original list of control 
variables without affecting the results. Therefore, we need instruments for PIN: a 
variable that is correlated with PIN (this assumption can be tested), but uncorrelated 
with bank capital structure except indirectly through other independent variables. 
 
Following the literature (Ferreira et al., 2011; Easley et al., 2002), we instrument PIN 
of a specific firm in each year, by using the share turnover and annual stock volatility 
as instruments. Share turnover is also likely to be strong correlated with PIN, 
consistent with the intuition that stocks with greater trading activity tend to have more 
uninformed order flow (Easley et al., 2002). This instrument variable has never been 
used as explanatory variables of bank capital in previous studies. Another instrument 
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variable is stock return volatility, that is the standard deviation of the daily returns. As 
the volatility of stock return corresponds to information arrival to the stock market: 
the more information arrival, the more volatile a price. A daily return, which is a sum 
of each intraday return, then depends on the daily number of information arrivals. 
This indicate that daily volatility is also an increasing function of the number of 
information arrivals, which represents more strengthening market discipline from 
stock market. A high volatility reflects intensive arrival of information. This 
instrument variable has been found to be significantly correlated with PIN. The 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for a given year has a mean of 
0.0190 with a standard deviation of 0.007. This figure is comparable to the figure 
reported in Bai and Elyasiani, (2013) using U.S. data. 
 
Based on these two instruments, we perform a two-stage IV regression as follows. We 
regress PIN on two instruments in the first stage and then regress our capital on 
predicted PIN in the second stage, together with firm-level control variables and year 
fixed effects.  
First stage: 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Second stage: 
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 7) 
 
In first stage regressions, our instruments significantly correlate with PIN at a 1% 
significance level. In the second stage regressions, the Hansen's over-identification 
test fails to reject the hypothesis that our instruments are exogenous. As columns (1) 
and (2) of Table (9) illustrate, the second-stage regressions in table (9) show a strong 
positive correlation between predicted PIN and ETA. The result also supports our 
earlier findings that market discipline enhances ban capital in listed banks. 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
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6.2 Dynamic estimation - GMM 
To further confirm our finding and address the correlation and possible endogeneity 
problems, we consider the difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimators developed for dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 
lagged values of the explanatory variable are used as instruments for the equation in 
first differences. However, this ‘difference estimator’ has been found to exacerbate 
measurement error biases in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). To reduce the potential biases and imprecision 
associated with the difference estimator, following Berger et al. (2009b), we employ 
the system GMM estimator which proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). System GMM estimator uses lagged differences of the 
explanatory variables as instruments in differences and levels equations, as well as 
lagged values of other regressors which might suffer endogeneity. The system GMM 
estimator controls for unobserved heterogeneity and for the persistence of the 
dependent variable. In addition, two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard error also been used in our estimation.  
 
Compared to the IV-2SLS methods, dynamic GMM estimator has the advantages of: 
(1) tackling the endogeneity problem based on internal instruments instead of relying 
on external instruments, which may not be readily available, and (2) explicitly 
modeling the dynamic nature of the capital and market discipline relationship by 
including past capital as one of the independent variable. 
 
To tackle potential serial correlations, we use the first differences of the dependent 
variables which following the Blundell and Bond (1998). The lags of each 
independent variable are used as instruments to account for the simultaneity of capital 
and bank inefficiency. These instrument variables are valid under the assumption that 
the correlation between the bank-specific effect and the levels of the independent 
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variables is constant over time. To generate consistent estimations of parameters, both 
the validity of the assumption in error term and instrument need to be considering. 
Following De Jonghe and Oztekin (2015), Fu et al. (2014a) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011), 
we perform two tests of the GMM model. The first test is to examine the assumption 
of no serial correlation in the error term. The differenced error term is being test for 
second-order serially correlated. Second test is a Hansen test of over-identifying 
restriction, which tests the overall validity of the instruments, and the null hypothesis 
is the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.  
 
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(Equation 8) 
 
Table (9) presents the system GMM result. In addition, the first and second order 
correlation tests, and the Hansen tests of instrument validity, as well as the F test of 
model statistical significance. The lagged dependent variable for ETA are statically 
significant across all specifications, indicating a high degree of persistence of bank 
capital and justifying the use of a dynamic model. Again, we find that ETA is 
positively and statistically significant linking with PIN. Therefore, we are able to 
confirm that the market discipline influences the level of capital.  
 
Overall, the system GMM estimates in Table (9) support our previous findings that 
even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity. The diagnostics tests in Table (9) show that the model is well-fitted with 
statistically insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation in second 
differences (AR2) and Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The 
residuals in the first difference should be serially correlated (AR1) by way of 
construction but the residuals in the second difference should not be serially 
correlated (AR2). Accordingly, results show statistically significant AR1 and 
statistically insignificant AR2 for all bank risk measures. Likewise, the Hansen 
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statistics of over-identifying restrictions tests the null of instrument validity and the 
statistically insignificant Hansen J-statistics for all the specifications indicate that the 
instruments are valid in the respective estimation. 
 
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
 
6.3 Alternative capital structure measure 
In this section, we examine whether above results are robust to replacing the capital 
ratio variables. We use an alternative definition of bank capital. Specifically, we 
replace the measure of capital structure with the regulatory capital requirement. Table 
(11) contains estimation results for the baseline model for the full sample using capital 
buffer (BUF) as dependent variable. The magnitudes of the coefficients are 
qualitatively unchanged, even the significance raised for some variables. The 
coefficients of PIN in regressions (1) to (3), which are termed slope shifters, are 0.049, 
0.046, and 0.042, respectively. Again, all three coefficients of PIN are positively and 
statistically at the 1% or 5% significance level, which is even stronger result than ETA 
as dependent variable in Table (5).  
[TABLE 11 HERE] 
 
The estimated equation, on the other hand, passes without any major problem the 
standard goodness-of-fit tests. Major variables have the expected sign and most of 
them are significant even at 1%. There is significant negative first-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals (AR1 statistic) and nil second-order correlation (AR2), 
as should be the case if the error term (in levels) is white noise. The Hansen test for 
validity of the instruments used is also fully satisfactory, showing a p-value of 0.26. 
 
7 Conclusions 
44 
 
For banks going public, previous literature focus mainly on the impact of stock price 
or return on bank performance, while the role of market discipline reflected by stock 
price and its potential effect on bank capital is a relatively unexplored area. A large 
body of evidence suggests that markets monitor financial firms effectively and 
promptly, but specific tests of investor trading have been much more limited. Holding 
capital is costly due to agency and information costs. Yet banks are required to carry 
minimum capital to maintain its default value at an acceptable level. This paper 
attempts to link the literature concerned with market discipline and the numerous 
empirical works on bank capital, which two to the best of our knowledge, have never 
been integrated before. Using a large sample of Chinese listed banks between 2006 
and 2014, result shows that banks with strong market discipline have higher level of 
bank capital. In addition, we also find that market discipline is negatively associated 
with bank capital when bank underperforming. The findings imply that frictions 
associated with asymmetric information problems in stock market do matter for bank 
access to external finance. The results shed new light on the understanding of the role 
of market discipline for the prudential banking industry. 
 
Our work departs from the literature on information structure of corporate securities 
and bank capital in several respects. First, it fills the gap in the literature and provides 
for the first time a comprehensive assessment of the causal relationship between 
market discipline and bank capital structure in Chinese banking. This study is the first 
paper to predict and find this relation. Second, while previous literature on high 
frequency data has been dominated by empirical studies in the developed capital 
markets of US and Europe, our data covers three major Chinese regulatory regimes 
including Mainland China, Hongkong and Taiwan, an interesting market never been 
explored in the past. Third, our proxy for market discipline is PIN, which is calculated 
by high frequency data and bases on the imbalance between buy and sell orders 
among investors. PIN may validate and strengthen previous studies focusing on 
accounting data, such as financial ratios and other accounting numbers. Those public 
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known accounting information is incorporated in the price formation process in an 
efficient market, but the private information may not be taken into consideration. 
Fourth, beside the OLS and FE estimators, we also employ the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) method to account for endogeneity, unobserved heteorogeneity and 
for the persistence of dependent variables. This estimator yields consistent estimations 
of parameters compared with OLS estimation, which may lead to inconsistent 
estimates in this type of study.  
 
The findings highlight several important issues for policymakers in those three 
markets. First, the governance role of market discipline can complement internal 
governance mechanism as stock markets performing a monitoring role, which will 
lead to an improvement of bank performance. This is especially useful for regulator in 
designing trading regulation to achieve fair competition in stock market. Second, 
regulators should encourage financial institution monitoring their stock price reaction 
of disclosure in order to enhance risk management. Third, with the mixed empirical 
findings on the relation between capital and bank efficiency, we argue that prudential 
regulation and supervision on capital requirement could affect the bank performance. 
Our finding extends the understanding of relationship between bank efficiency and 
stock price in Chinese market. 
 
Our analysis offers a simple fundamentals-based explanation for why banks need to 
maintain high level of capital. From a methodological viewpoint, both the higher 
frequency data, compensatory effects between bank specific information and 
macroeconomic data prove the usefulness of measure the market discipline and bank 
capital, particularly when banks are investigated.  
 
Our findings indicate a rich set of future research aspects. First, we have focused on 
market factors associated with financial firms. However, many non-financial firms in 
emerging economies also face high degree of information asymmetry. Therefore 
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future research should verify whether our findings can be replicated in non-financial 
industry. Second, PIN can act as one the external corporate governance to influence 
bank capital structure. However, some internal corporate governance, such as board 
composition and the ownership structure, also can affect the level of capital. For 
example, is better internal governance associated with capital structure? Third, there is 
little known about the inter-relationship between the external and internal corporate 
governance. Future research should address these important questions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for PIN and bank inefficiency 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: PIN and its components  
PIN 385 0.180 0.105 0.001 0.800 
ALPHA 385 0.648 0.263 0.001 1.000 
MU 385 5.174 0.846 2.274 7.597 
EPSILON 385 5.522 1.424 0.878 7.600 
 
Panel B: Variables in stochastic frontier approach for efficiency 
Profit before tax (TP) 385 0.108 0.011 0.026 0.142 
      
Output quantities      
Gross loans (Y1) 385 0.539 0.118 0.181 0.776 
Other earning assets 
(Y2) 
385 0.396 0.117 0.170 0.695 
      
Input prices      
Price of labour (P1) 385 1.66 1.362 0.300 15.34 
Price of capital (P2) 385 0.023 0.042 0.002 0.627 
      
Control variables      
Fixed assets (Z1) 385 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.054 
Total earning assets 
(Z2) 
385 0.928 0.052 0.744 0.988 
Note: PIN is probability of informed trading. ALPHA is probability of an information event. MU is arrival rate of informed traders. 
EPSILON is arrival rate of uninformed investors. The summary statistics of MU and EPSILON are based on the natural logarithm of MU 
and EPSILON. All variables in Panel B are normalized by total asset except for input prices. Price of labor (P1) is the ratio of operating 
expenses to average assets. Price of capital (P2) is the ratio of total interest expense to total interest bearing borrowed funds. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  
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Table 2: Definition of variables 
Variables Symbol Description  Sources 
Capital  ETA The ratio of equity to average asset. Bankscope 
Capital buffer BUF The bank’s capital less its 
requirement by regulator divided by 
the requirements 
Bankscope 
Information 
asymmetry 
PIN The probability of informed trading 
calculated by equation (3). 
Use original trade and 
quote data from stock 
exchange to estimate 
Profit inefficiency PEFF The score of profit inefficiency 
obtained using stochastic frontier 
approach with translog 
specifications. 
Use original 
Bankscope data to 
estimate 
Return on average 
assets 
ROAA The ratio of profit on average assets. Bankscope 
Return on average 
equity 
ROAE The ratio of profit on average 
equity. 
Bankscope 
    
Bank size LNTA The natural logarithm of total assets 
in thousands of USD. 
Bankscope 
Non-performance loan NPL The ratio of non-perform loan to 
total loans 
Bankscope 
Net interest margin NIM Net interest income divided by total 
assets 
Bankscope 
Liquidity risk LCA Liquid assets to short term funding Bankscope 
Credit risk CR Risk-weighted assets dividend by 
total assets 
Bankscope 
    
GDP growth rate GDPG The yearly real GDP growth (%). Datastream 
Inflation rate INF Inflation rate. Datastream 
GDP per-capital GDPP Domestic GDP (in USD) over the 
number of inhabitants. 
Datastream 
Lending interest LINT Lending interest rate. Datastream 
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Table 3: Number of banks in samples used for estimating PIN and efficiency 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Mainland 7 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 129 
Hongkong 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 58 
Taiwan 21 21 21 21 23 23 22 22 22 198 
 34 41 41 41 45 46 45 45 445 385 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for main model variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ETA 385 0.158 0.056 0.021 0.446 
BUF 385 0.136 0.039 0.001 0.250 
PIN 385 0.180 0.105 0.001 0.659 
PEFF 385 0.052 0.107 0.005 1.000 
ROAA 385 0.709 0.906 -0.055 0.045 
ROAE 385 0.103 0.130 -1.013 0.385 
LNTA 385 17.86 1.546 15.30 21.52 
NPL 385 1.516 0.929 0.226 4.648 
NIM 385 2.002 0.747 0.750 4.230 
LAC 385 26.37 14.74 2.340 102.4 
CR 385 0.076 0.054 0.022 0.457 
GDPG 385 5.599 4.456 -2.459 14.16 
INF 385 2.196 1.920 -0.860 5.864 
GDPP 385 9.770 4.213 -2.670 13.57 
LINT 385 4.527 1.554 2.560 7.900 
Note: This table contains means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values on the variables included in the main model. ETA is 
the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the probability of 
informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier approach with 
translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total assets in natural 
logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC is liquid assets 
to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP grow per capital. 
INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate.  
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Table 5: The relationship between information asymmetry and capital 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE FE 
Dependent variable  ETA ETA ETA 
     
PIN  0.024* 0.031** 0.034**  
  (1.68) (2.21) (2.44) 
LNTA  -0.008*** -0.027*** -0.004 
  (-3.44) (-4.08) (-0.41)    
NIM  -0.009* -0.012** -0.011**  
  (-1.95) (-2.18) (-1.97)    
LAC  0.001 2.15e-05 6.73e-05 
  (1.54) (0.10) (0.33) 
CR  -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
  (-15.42) (-16.14) (-15.19)    
NPL  0.604** 0.949*** 0.743**  
  (2.13) (3.31) (2.54) 
GDPG  0.001  -0.001 
  (1.11)  (-0.16)    
INF  -0.001  -0.002 
  (-0.89)  (-1.50)    
GDPP  -0.038***  -0.077**  
  (-5.88)  (-2.56)    
LINT  -0.001  -0.002 
  (-0.56)  (-0.97)    
Constant  0.766*** 0.773*** 1.129*** 
  (10.27) (6.79) (5.70) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.516 0.528 0.541 
Year fixed effect  Y Y Y 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 6: The relationship between information asymmetry and capital buffer 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS FE FE 
Dependent variable  BUF BUF BUF 
     
PIN  0.049*** 0.046** 0.042**  
  (2.58) (2.42) (2.19) 
LNTA  -0.001 -0.011 -0.020 
  (-0.36) (-1.23) (-1.44)    
NIM  0.002 0.008 0.008 
  (0.42) (1.01) (1.03) 
LAC  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.77) (1.56) (1.41) 
CR  0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (4.07) (4.51) (4.20) 
NPL  -1.393*** -1.654*** -1.508*** 
  (-3.98) (-4.31) (-3.84)    
GDPG  -0.001  0.001 
  (-0.75)  (0.46) 
INF  -0.001  0.001 
  (-0.30)  (0.61) 
GDPP  -0.0345***  0.014 
  (-3.47)  (0.36) 
LINT  0.004  0.009**  
  (1.37)  (2.42) 
Constant  0.463*** 0.290* 0.254 
  (3.84) (1.93) (0.97) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.146 0.155 0.173 
Year fixed effect  Y Y Y 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 7: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though bank 
profit inefficiency - OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS OLS OLS 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  PEFF ETA BUF 
    
PIN  0.087*   
  (1.68)   
Fitted PEFF   0.398*** 0.119 
   (2.80) (0.66) 
LNTA  -0.025*** 0.002 0.006 
  (-5.35) (0.49) (1.13) 
NIM  0.025** -0.018*** -0.002 
  (2.23) (-3.25) (-0.35)    
LAC  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.69) (0.95) (0.56) 
CR  -0.001 -0.010*** 0.003*** 
  (-1.17) (-13.94) (3.93) 
NPL  5.947*** -1.733** -1.828*   
  (6.77) (-1.97) (-1.65)    
GDPG   0.001 -0.001 
   (1.13) (-0.61) 
INF  -0.002 -0.001 -3.1e-05 
  (-0.74) (-0.27) (-0.03)    
GDPP  0.002*** -0.054*** -0.019*   
  (3.66) (-6.33) (-1.83)    
LINT  -0.004 0.001 0.002 
  (-0.94) (0.61) (1.04) 
Constant  0.333*** 0.760*** 0.209**  
  (3.87) (10.24) (2.39) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.120 0.500 0.100 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 8: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though bank 
profit inefficiency - FE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  FE FE FE 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  PEFF ETA BUF 
     
PIN  0.015*   
  (1.67)   
Fitted PEFF   1.843** 2.505**  
   (2.10) (2.03) 
LNTA  0.044 -0.098** -0.123**  
  (1.22) (-2.45) (-2.20)    
NIM  0.021 -0.049** -0.050*   
  (1.00) (-2.56) (-1.93)    
LAC  0.001* -0.002** -0.003*   
  (1.76) (-2.04) (-1.87)    
CR  -0.002 -0.010*** 0.010*** 
  (-0.55) (-5.31) (3.64) 
NPL  6.083*** -10.29* -16.62**  
  (5.07) (-1.93) (-2.21)    
GDPG   0.002** 0.002*   
   (2.12) (1.73) 
INF  0.001 -0.003** -0.004**  
  (0.44) (-1.99) (-2.06)    
GDPP  -0.144** 0.240* 0.393**  
  (-1.98) (1.86) (2.18) 
LINT  0.002 -0.006** -0.001 
  (0.33) (-2.16) (-0.33)    
Constant  0.495 -0.090 -1.257**  
  (1.45) (-0.20) (-1.97)    
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.160 0.529 0.128 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
 
  
61 
 
Table 9: The relationship between information asymmetry and capital – Difference GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ETA BUF 
     
Lag.ETA 0.073*** 0.082***   
 (14.27) (2.88)   
Lag.BUF   0.264*** 0.199*** 
   (12.98) (9.32) 
PIN 0.041*** 0.073*** 0.030*** 0.017*   
 (4.26) (2.99) (6.00) (1.97) 
LNTA -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.003** -0.010*** 
 (-6.09) (-3.89) (2.47) (-3.46)    
NIM -0.002 -0.011** -0.008*** -0.023*** 
 (-0.55) (-2.06) (-4.65) (-5.80)    
LAC -7.5e-05 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.67) (-1.12) (-7.57) (-9.12)    
CR -0.018*** -0.020*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (-20.13) (-9.46) (11.33) (15.80) 
NPL 0.702*** 0.654** -2.385*** -1.952*** 
 (4.48) (2.59) (-12.87) (-7.51)    
GDPG  0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (3.68)  (-5.56)    
INF  -1.8e-05  0.001 
  (-0.07)  (0.75) 
GDPP  0.009***  0.029*** 
  (3.06)  (8.46) 
LINT  0.001  0.007*** 
  (1.43)  (8.23) 
     
Observation 290 290 290 290 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1 0.027 0.011 0.002 0.005 
AR2 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.104 
Hansan 0.626 0.950 1.000 1.000 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 10: The relationship between information asymmetry and capital – System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ETA BUF 
     
Lag.ETA 0.592*** 0.467***   
 (107.78) (28.91)   
Lag.BUF   0.679*** 0.512*** 
   (26.02) (8.92) 
PIN 0.019*** 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 
 (4.12) (5.15) (3.58) (2.85) 
LNTA -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 
 (-1.05) (1.00) (0.83) (3.25) 
NIM -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.001 0.010*** 
 (-9.92) (-4.29) (0.74) (3.19) 
LAC 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001** -9.9E-05 
 (29.71) (15.9) (-2.09) (-1.55)    
CR -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (-37.96) (-17.71) (5.74) (6.16) 
NPL 0.313*** -0.416*** -0.038 -0.994*** 
 (10.25) (-3.24) (-0.17) (-3.06)    
GDPG  0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (5.74)  (-2.97)    
INF  -0.001***  -0.001*   
  (-2.88)  (-1.94)    
GDPP  -0.023***  -0.009*** 
  (-23.20)  (-3.39)    
LINT  -0.001***  -0.002**  
  (-3.28)  (-2.41)    
Constant 0.086*** 0.336*** 0.015 0.055 
 (11.66) (15.18) (0.89) (1.46) 
     
Observation 337 337 337 337 
F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1 0.037 0.025 0.001 0.001 
AR2 0.238 0.278 0.144 0.120 
Hansan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 11: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though bank 
profit inefficiency – System GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  PEFF ETA BUF 
     
Lag.PEFF, Lag.ETA, Lag.BUF  0.348*** 0.576*** 0.574*** 
  (24.55) (37.59) (50.62) 
PIN  0.093***   
  (11.75)   
Fitted PEFF   0.101*** 0.182*** 
   (4.19) (17.80) 
LNTA  -0.014*** 0.001* 0.004*** 
  (-11.37) (1.87) (7.63) 
NIM  0.009*** 0.001 0.007*** 
  (2.81) (0.09) (12.10) 
LAC  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 
  (2.77) (6.30) (0.42) 
CR  0.001 -0.003*** 0.001*** 
  (0.67) (-9.20) (3.24) 
NPL  3.150*** -0.526*** -0.589*** 
  (8.94) (-3.58) (-5.57)    
GDPG   -0.001 -0.001*** 
   (-0.11) (-3.01) 
INF  0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 
  (8.67) (-0.99) (-0.87)    
GDPP  0.028*** -0.017*** -0.010*** 
  (20.76) (-13.47) (-8.11)    
LINT  0.004*** -0.002*** -0.007*** 
  (6.55) (-5.49) (-6.86)    
Constant  -0.106*** 0.244*** 0.099*** 
  (-4.92) (14.62) (6.18) 
     
Observation  337 291 291 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1  0.116 0.000 0.000 
AR2  0.129 0.124 0.621 
Hansan  0.473 0.376 0.415 
Note ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
 
  
64 
 
Table 12: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAE - 
OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS OLS OLS 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAE ETA BUF 
PIN  -15.83***   
  (-2.83)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.001* -0.002**  
   (-1.68) (-2.06)    
LNTA  5.007*** -0.001 0.015**  
  (9.16) (-0.08) (2.34) 
NIM  -0.568 -0.009** 0.001 
  (-0.44) (-2.14) (0.01) 
LAC  -0.091 0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.64) (0.68) (-0.39)    
CR  0.469*** -0.010*** 0.004*** 
  (2.77) (-12.21) (4.41) 
NPL  -5.589*** -0.261 -2.527*** 
  (-5.81) (-0.45) (-3.32)    
GDPG   0.001 -0.001 
   (1.11) (-0.19)    
INF  0.218 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.64) (-0.48) (0.16) 
GDPP  -4.167** -0.045*** -0.024*** 
  (-2.48) (-6.02) (-2.76)    
LINT  0.781 0.001 0.003*   
  (1.40) (0.11) (1.66) 
Constant  -31.17 0.717*** 0.110 
  (-1.51) (8.65) (1.11) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.167 0.516 0.102 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
 
  
65 
 
Table 13: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAE - 
FE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  FE FE FE 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAE ETA BUF 
PIN  -10.94*   
  (-1.97)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.002** -0.003**  
   (-2.10) (-2.03)    
LNTA  -2.421 -0.022** -0.020*   
  (-0.68) (-2.45) (-1.65)    
NIM  -6.946*** -0.028*** -0.022 
  (-3.31) (-2.83) (-1.65)    
LAC  -0.268*** -0.001* -0.0013 
  (-3.31) (-1.72) (-1.34)    
CR  1.107*** -0.011*** 0.009*** 
  (2.94) (-7.09) (3.95) 
NPL  -5.666*** -0.585 -3.431*** 
  (-4.83) (-0.77) (-3.16)    
GDPG   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.90) (-0.04)    
INF  0.048 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.15) (-0.41) (-0.68)    
GDPP  16.03** 0.016 0.089**  
  (2.25) (0.60) (2.38) 
LINT  0.141 -0.001 0.005**  
  (0.19) (-0.55) (2.20) 
Constant  -80.33** 0.608*** -0.307 
  (-2.45) (4.39) (-1.58) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.268 0.529 0.128 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 14: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAE – 
System GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAE ETA BUF 
     
Lag.ROAE, Lag.ETA, Lag.BUF 0.755*** 0.602*** 0.632*** 
  (63.46) (41.17) (39.54) 
PIN  -11.99***   
  (-13.62)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (-5.49) (-10.97)    
LNTA  0.704*** 0.001 0.001 
  (4.10) (0.61) (0.51) 
NIM  0.924*** 0.004** 0.007*** 
  (3.40) (2.66) (6.55) 
LAC  -0.081*** 0.001*** -0.001 
  (-3.42) (3.30) (-1.24)    
CR  0.210** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
  (2.25) (-6.63) (3.00) 
NPL  -81.45*** -0.236* 0.195 
  (-2.71) (-1.79) (1.13) 
GDPG   0.001 0.001*   
   (1.31) (2.01) 
INF  -0.603*** -0.001** -0.002*** 
  (-7.80) (-2.24) (-6.24)    
GDPP  -0.213 -0.011*** 0.001* 
  (-0.46) (-9.71) (1.67) 
LINT  0.200 -0.001 0.001 
  (1.54) (-1.21) (1.12) 
Constant  -4.371 0.189*** 0.022**  
  (-0.78) (11.06) (2.67) 
     
Observation  337 291 291 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1  0.003 0.001 0.000 
AR2  0.349 0.167 0.293 
Hansan  0.422 0.405 0.458 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 15: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAA - 
OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS OLS OLS 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAA ETA BUF 
PIN  -0.880**   
  (-2.19)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.027* -0.044**  
   (-1.68) (-2.06)    
LNTA  0.324*** 0.001 0.017**  
  (8.59) (0.14) (2.33) 
NIM  -0.047 -0.010** -0.001 
  (-0.53) (-2.22) (-0.11)    
LAC  -0.006 0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.61) (0.48) (-0.58)    
CR  0.079*** -0.008*** 0.006*** 
  (6.83) (-5.68) (3.46) 
NPL  -42.48*** -0.579 -3.039*** 
  (-6.24) (-0.77) (-3.07)    
GDPG   0.001 -0.001 
   (1.11) (-0.19)    
INF  0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.29) (-0.65) (-0.05)    
GDPP  -0.179 -0.043*** -0.022*** 
  (-1.52) (-6.13) (-2.66)    
LINT  0.083** 0.001 0.005**  
  (2.10) (0.58) (2.01) 
Constant  -3.290** 0.674*** 0.040 
  (-2.29) (6.92) (0.34) 
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.198 0.516 0.102 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 16: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAA - 
FE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  FE FE FE 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAA ETA BUF 
PIN  -0.475*   
  (-1.65)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.061** -0.083**  
   (-2.10) (-2.03)    
LNTA  0.034 -0.014 -0.008 
  (0.13) (-1.61) (-0.76)    
NIM  -0.298* -0.028*** -0.021 
  (-1.91) (-2.84) (-1.64)    
LAC  -0.017*** -0.001* -0.001 
  (-2.90) (-1.88) (-1.58)    
CR  0.153*** -0.005 0.017*** 
  (5.48) (-1.19) (2.80) 
NPL  -4.661*** -1.933 -5.262*** 
  (-5.35) (-1.40) (-2.69)    
GDPG   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.90) (-0.04)    
INF  -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.53) (-1.36) (-1.57)    
GDPP  0.884* 0.028 0.105**  
  (1.67) (0.88) (2.39) 
LINT  0.028 0.001 0.007*** 
  (0.51) (0.16) (2.69) 
Constant  -7.977*** 0.334 -0.680*   
  (-3.27) (1.30) (-1.88)    
     
Observation  385 385 385 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
R  0.265 0.529 0.128 
     
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Table 17: The relationship between information asymmetry and bank capital though ROAA – 
System GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable  ROAA ETA BUF 
     
Lag.ROAA, Lag.ETA, Lag.BUF 0.750*** 0.581*** 0.744*** 
  (58.27) (42.62) (37.81) 
PIN  -0.794***   
  (-10.64)   
Fitted PEFF   -0.004*** -0.010*** 
   (-3.37) (-7.12)    
LNTA  0.085*** -0.001 0.001*** 
  (5.71) (-0.36) (3.50) 
NIM  0.164*** 0.002 0.009*** 
  (8.23) (1.54) (7.51) 
LAC  -0.012*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-6.81) (4.36) (-7.91)    
CR  0.035*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
  (5.22) (-8.46) (13.78) 
NPL  -15.07*** -0.256* -0.329*   
  (-6.11) (-2.01) (-1.89)    
GDPG   -0.001 0.001*   
   (-0.13) (1.95) 
INF  -0.084*** -0.001 -0.003*** 
  (-11.48) (-1.60) (-8.19)    
GDPP  -0.012 -0.013*** 0.002**  
  (-0.92) (-12.98) (2.15) 
LINT  0.010 -0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (0.87) (-2.96) (3.50) 
Constant  -0.931*** 0.216*** -0.025*   
  (-4.11) (13.99) (-1.87)    
     
Observation  337 291 291 
F test  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ar1  0.079 0.001 0.000 
AR2  0.216 0.124 0.253 
Hansan  0.140 0.388 0.500 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the 
probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier 
approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total 
assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC 
is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
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Appendix A: Correlations 
 ETA BUF PIN PEFF ROAA ROAE LNTA NPL NIM LAC CR GDPG INF GDPP LINT 
ETA 1.000               
BUF -0.289* 1.000              
PIN -0.146* 0.101 1.000             
PEFF -0.048 -0.245* 0.115* 1.000            
ROAA -0.686* 0.219* 0.118* 0.082 1.000           
ROAE 0.227* 0.004 -0.236* -0.220* -0.270* 1.000          
LNTA 0.118* 0.001 -0.267* 0.258* 0.043 0.381* 1.000         
NPL 0.216* -0.059 -0.259* 0.170* -0.235* 0.421* 0.595* 1.000        
NIM -0.115* 0.154* -0.068 -0.013 0.416* 0.263* 0.176* 0.266* 1.000       
LAC -0.213* 0.234* -0.184* -0.763* 0.195* 0.363* -0.067 0.010 0.228* 1.000      
CR 0.052 0.113* -0.287* -0.715* -0.107* 0.520* 0.036 0.178* 0.141* 0.873* 1.000     
GDPG 0.242* -0.016 -0.445* -0.089 -0.160* 0.416* 0.446* 0.487* 0.125* 0.215* 0.329* 1.000    
INF -0.035 -0.066 -0.166* -0.059 -0.045 0.276* 0.119* 0.305* 0.158* 0.217* 0.257* 0.336* 1.000   
GDPP -0.416* -0.103* 0.337* 0.036 0.197* -0.439* -0.681* -0.518* -0.09 -0.043 -0.216* -0.608* -0.070 1.000  
LINT 0.090 -0.097 -0.372* -0.076 -0.140* 0.484* 0.318* 0.527* 0.254* 0.314* 0.407* 0.576* 0.580* -0.303* 1.000 
Note: ETA is the ratio of equity to asset. BUF is bank’s capital less its requirement by regulator divided by the requirements. PIN is the probability of informed trading given by equation (3). PEFF represents the score of profit 
efficiency obtained from the stochastic frontier approach with translog specifications. ROAA is the ratio of profit on average assets. ROAE is the ratio of average equity. LNTA is total assets in natural logarithem. NPL is the ratio of 
non-perform loan to total loans. NIM is the net interest income divided by total assets. LAC is liquid assets to short term funding. CR is the risk-weighted assets dividend by total assets. GDPG is GDP growth rate. GDPP is GDP 
grow per capital. INF is the inflation rate. LINT is the lending interest rate. 
 
 
